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A sceptre snatch'd with an unruly hand
Must be as boisterously maintain'd as gain'd;
And he that stands upon a slippery place
Makes nice of no vile hold to stay him up
-William Shakespeare
I. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no constitutional protection is more important than an
individual's First Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression.2
There is sharp debate between proponents of legislative limits on offensive
expression in favor of morality and those who favor protection of all types
of expression as the bulwark of American freedom and democracy.3 The
government's police power and interest in revenue raising, specifically
land use control via zoning and licensing regulation, frequently clashes
with the right to free speech. This hotly contested area of constitutional law
has produced a vast and uncertain body of case law surrounding
governmental regulation of speech.
The landmark decision by the Supreme Court in Freedmanv. Maryland
established the line for governmental responsibility in the censorship of
obscenity.4 However, that line has been stretched and obscured. In
Freedman,the Court mandated three procedural safeguards to be applied
in a licensing scheme that amounted to the prior restraint of an obscene
motion picture.5 What have become commonly-referred to as the
"Freedman protections"6 have escaped the narrow confines of the
obscenity realm and are invading other areas of governmental regulation.
Freedman has become a fierce judicially-created guardian of the
constitutional right to free speech, as well as a useful weapon against the
regulatory power. Its ill-defined protections and uncertain applicability
have resulted in a proverbial slippery slope. Further, Supreme Court
decisions have spawned much controversy and uncertainty in prior restraint
jurisprudence and government regulation of speech.
1. WILUAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN, act 3, sc. 4 (Greenwich House 1984) (1900).
2. See J. David Guerra, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Meaning of PromptJudicialReview
UnderthePriorRestraintDoctrineAfterFWIPBSv. City of Dallas, 62 BROOK.L.REv. 1217,1217
(1996) (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943), for "asserting that freedom of
speech represents an individual right which is superior to others").
3. See id.
4. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
5. See id. at 60.
6. The protections are commonly referred to as "Freedman protections" or the "Freedman
procedures" or the "Freedmansafeguards."
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This Note is not intended as a comprehensive analysis of this immense
body of case law. Rather, the goal is to raise the awareness of both
Practitioners and of Administrators regarding Freedman's tremendous
potential applicability to zoning and licensing activities. To date,
Freedmanhas been cited in legal databases over one thousand times. This
Note explores the vast, complex, and inconsistent area of prior restraints
frequently imposed by governments on protected speech. Second, this Note
discusses Freedman'sthree imprecise requirements and the resulting split
among the Circuits. Third, this Note discusses the Eleventh Circuit's
position regarding exactly what satisfies the judicial review requirement
and Freedman'sapplicability to sign ordinances. Fourth, this Note suggests
a Practitioner's model for instituting constitutional challenges to licensing
regimes, and an Administrator's model for defending its ordinances.
Finally, this Note exhorts the Supreme Court to establish well-defined
guidelines as to exactly what constitutional safeguards are appropriate,
when they should apply, and to what subject matter they should apply, and
to reasonably limit Freedman'sapplicability and prevent its further slip
into uncharted waters.
II. COMMON LAW ORIGINS
A. The PriorRestraintDoctrine
The prior restraint doctrine is rooted in Blackstone's principle:
"[liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous restraints upon

publications." 7 Blackstone asserted that one has an "undoubted right to
present to the public what he thinks... and society's remedy for illegal

speech is subsequent punishment." 8 Behind this theory is a concept deeply
embedded in our law that "a free society prefers to punish the few who
abuse rights of speech afterthey break the law than to throttle them and all
others beforehand." 9 A system of prior restraint is defined as "any scheme
which gives public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance
of its actual expression."' 0 Although prior restraints are not per se
unconstitutional, any system of prior restraint bears a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."

7. Michael L. Charlson, Comment, The Constitutionalityof Expanding Prepublication
Review of Government Employee's Speech, 72 CAL L. REV. 962, 975 (1984) (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ONTHE LAWS oFENGLAND, Book IV at 15lv (Layston Press 1966)).
8. Id.
9. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
10. BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 828 (6th ed. 1991).
11. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,225 (1990); SoutheasternPromotions,
420 U.S. at 558; New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
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While prior restraints are often in the form of judicial injunctions
against publication,12 they are also recognized in zoning and licensing
schemes. 3 Generally, these regulations present two types of impermissible
prior restraint. 4 The first type is a scheme that places "unbridled discretion
in the hands of a government official or agency" and might result in
censorship. 5 It is well settled that an ordinance which "'makes the
peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees
contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official . . . is an
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those
freedoms'."16
The second type of impermissible prior restraint is a licensing scheme
that fails to place limits on the time within which the decision maker must
issue the license.17 Like a censorship system, a licensing scheme creates the
possibility that constitutionally-protected speech will be suppressed if there
are inadequate procedural safeguards because the "delay compel[s] the
speaker's silence."'"
Governments are not prohibited from imposing valid time, place, and
manner prohibitions on speech if they are completely content-neutral,
narrowly tailored to serve substantial governmental interests, and leave
open an alternative channel for communication.1 9 However, "[a
government] may not condition that speech on obtaining a license or
permit from a government official in that official's boundless discretion."'
Systems of prior restraints are viewed suspiciously, but may be upheld if
the regulation at issue can survive the heavy burden against
21
constitutionality.
Alternatively, if the regulation is a content-based restriction on speech,
it will survive constitutional scrutiny only if it is "necessary to serve a

70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
12. See generally Bernstein v. Department of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(striking an Export Administration Regulation that regulated distribution ofencryption software as
an impermissible prior restraint on speech because it vested unlimited discretion in government
officials and lacked adequate procedural safeguards).
13. See id. at 1303-04 (citing FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215; City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,764 (1998)).
14. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225.
15. Id. at 225-26 (quoting City of Lakewood., 486 U.S. at 757).
16. Id. at 226 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151).
17. See id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (where the statute was
stricken because it restrained speech for an "indefinite duration")).
18. Id. (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988)).
19. See Goward v. City of Minneapolis, 456 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
20. Bernstein v. Department of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing City
of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 764).
21. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 225; Southeastern Promotions,420 U.S. at 558; Shuttlesworth,
394 U.S. 150-51; see also Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/4

4

Whittington:
The Prior
Restraints
Doctrine
and
the Freedman Protections: Navig
THE PRIOR RESTRAINTS
DOCTRINE
AND THE
FREEDMAN
PROTECTIONS

compelling state interest and [is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'
The Court in Freedmanadded yet another requirement for a prior restraint
to survive constitutional scrutiny. The Court held that "[a system of prior
restraints] avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
23
system.
Accordingly, any time the government imposes a prior restraint on free
speech, it must provide certain procedural safeguards to prevent the
possibility of censorship. These safeguards were established in the
landmark decision of Freedmanv. Maryland.2' All three procedures are
mandatory when the speech at issue is political, except in cases involving
commercial venture permits in which there may be a slight relaxation of
the Freedman standards.' The procedures were designed to minimize the
risk of a government official controlling protected speech by unreasonable
delay that renders the speech obsolete, as in Freedman.26 The procedures
also reduce the risk that an official might hide behind permitting
27
restrictions to either deny or grant certain permits at will, as in FWPBS.
Both Federal and State case law applying the prior restraint doctrine is
vast and complex. In this area of law, Freedman and its progeny have
resulted in obscure standards as to what the protections are, as well as to
when and to what they will be applied.
B. Freedman v. Maryland andIts Three FirstAmendment Protections
To protect against the possibility of censorship, the Freedman Court
adopted three mandatory procedural safeguards which must be applied to
any prior restraint of free speech:' 1) the censor must bear the burden of
going to court to suppress the speech and, once there, must bear the burden
of persuasion;29 2) the authority must either issue a license within a

22. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); see also Goward, 456 N.W.2d at 466
(stating that "aesthetic interest alone cannot be a compelling state interest").
23. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,58 (1965)
24. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
25. See generally FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215 (relaxing the Freedman safeguards for
commercial zoning permits); see also Caf6 Erotica. Inc. v. St. Johns County, No: 98-597-CIV-J21C at *7 n2 (M.D. Fla. Jan 19, 1999) (explaining that "where the law under review places
restrictions on classes of 'expressive' businesses (generally sexually-oriented entertainment
businesses), the first requirement may be done away with") (quoting Church of Scientology Flag
Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
26. Freedman,380 U.S. at 59.
27. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228-30 (holding that the license is the key to the applicant's ability
to obtain and maintain a business, and the applicant has every incentive to pursue a permit denial
through court).

28. See id. at 227 (citing Freedman,380 U.S. at 58-60).
29. This safeguard is commonly referred to as the "burdens procedure" or "third Freedman
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specified brief period while maintaining the status quo or go to court;
31
available.
be
must
3) expeditious judicial review of that decision
In Freedman,the Court was faced with the constitutionality of a motion
picture censorship procedure administered by a state board of censors.32
Under the Maryland censorship scheme, the motion picture Revenge at
Daybreakcould not be exhibited pending conclusion of an administrative
hearing to determine whether the movie was obscene.3 3 The Maryland
statute required the submission of the film to the Board for examination,
and if disapproved, would provide immediate notice to the applicant. 34 If
the decision was appealed, the statute provided that the film would be
"promptly re-examined," with a further right of appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland.35
The Freedman Court held that the failure to place limitations on the
time within which a censorship board must make a determination of
36 The Court explained that
obscenity is a species of unbridled discretion.
"where a scheme creates a 'risk of delay' 37 such that 'every application of
the statute create[s] an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas,' 38 we

safeguard;" however, in Freedman, this was actually the first procedure specified. Compare
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59 (setting forth the safeguards) with FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 227
(erroneously numbering the three procedures).
30. This is commonly referred to as the "specified brief period" safeguard, or the "first
Freedmanprocedure;" however, in Freedman, this was actually the second procedure specified.
See supra note 29.
31. Commonly referred to as the "judicial review" procedure or "second Freedman
safeguard;" in Freedman, it was actually the third.See supra note 29.
32. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 52-53.
33. See id. at 52 n.2.
34. See id. at 55. The appeal from the decision of the Baltimore City Court to the Court of
Appeals of Maryland would be "subject generally to the time and manner provided for taking
appeal to the Court of Appeals." Id.
35. Id. at 55-56. The court explained, as follows:
Thus, there is no statutory provision for judicial participation in the procedure
which bars a film, nor even assurance of prompt judicial review. Risk of delay is
built into the Maryland procedure, as is borne out by experience; in the only
reported case indicating the length of time required to complete an appeal, the
initial judicial determination has taken four months and final vindication of the
film on appellate review, six months.
Id. (citing United Artists Corp. v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 124 A.2d 292 (Md. 1956)).
36. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 227 (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 56-57: Freedman's
statement that failure to confine time within which censor must make decision "contains the same
vice as a statute delegating excessive administrative discretion").
37. Id. at 223 (quoting Freedman,380 U.S. at 55).
38. Id. at 224 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 n.15
(1984)).
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have permitted parties to bring facial challenges."39
The Supreme Court was concerned that without these safeguards, it
might prove too burdensome for the exhibitor to seek review of any denial,
and it might take little to deter exhibition of a film in a given locality.4' The
FreedmanCourt also feared that the exhibitor's stake in a movie might not
be sufficient "to warrant a protracted and onerous course of litigation."41
Justice Brennan stated that
[u]nlike a prosecution for obscenity, a censorship proceeding
puts the initial burden on the exhibitor or distributor. Because
the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger
that he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an
independent branch of government-to the constitutionally
protected interests in free expression. And if it is made unduly
onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, to seek judicial
review, the censor's determination may in practice be final.42
Since the Maryland statute "failed to provide adequate safeguards
against undue inhibition of protected expression, ' 43 the Freedman Court
struck the Maryland censorship scheme, holding that the requirement of
prior submission of motion pictures to the Board was an invalid prior
restraint. 44 The Supreme Court declined to determine "how or whether"
Maryland should incorporate the required procedures, instead leaving it up
to the State to decide. 45 The Freedman Court did, however, suggest as a
model the New York statute upheld in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.46
This statute postponed any restraint on the sale of obscene books until a
judicial determination of obscenity occurred, following notice and an
adversary hearing.47 Justice Brennan specifically stated that the Court did
not mean to specify particular time limits, but that legislation should be
drafted in accord with local exhibition practices to avoid the "potentiallychilling effect" on protected expression.48 Consequently, much confusion

39. Id.
40. See Freedman,380 U.S. at 59.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 57-58.
43. Id. at 60.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
47. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60 (citing Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 436, where a New
York injunctive procedure which prevented the sale ofobscene books was upheld). That procedure
postponed restraint against sale until there was notice of an adversary hearing and thereafter a
judicial determination of obscenity. See id. The procedure specified a hearing one day afterjoinder
of issue, and a decision to be handed down within two days following the hearing. See id.
48. Id- at 61.
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has resulted regarding exactly what procedures are required.
Furthermore, the question of in which other contexts of government
control or when the procedures will be required is also unclear. The
Freedman decision was specifically and narrowly applied to the motion
picture industry and permitting schemes. The Supreme Court held that a
process that requires submission "of a film" to a censor avoids
constitutional infirmity only if there are safeguards designed to avoid the
dangers of censorship. 49 Additionally, the FreedmanCourt applied all three
of the safeguards to the submission of motion pictures to a censorship
board.5" Significantly, Justice Brennan cautioned:
Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very
little to deter exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor's
stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a
protracted and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on
the other hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the
burdens and delays of litigation in a particular area when,
without such difficulties, he can freely exhibit his film in
most of the rest of the country; for we are told that only four
States and a handful of municipalities have active censorship
laws.-"
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, proposed
that no form of censorship should be permitted, no matter what protections
were afforded. 2 Notably, Justice Douglas stated that "[t]he Court today
holds that a system of movie censorship must contain at least three
procedural safeguards if it is not to run afoul of the First Amendment. .*.* ""
Despite the apparent narrow construction of the decision, Freedmanhas
not been limited to licensing schemes that regulate the motion picture
industry, or even to prior censorship of obscenity in general. Nor have the
three safeguards remained absolutely intact.
IL. DEFINING THE FREEDMAN PROTECTIONS
A. The "Burdens"-OfSuppressionand of Persuasion
The first procedural requirement, frequently referred to as the
49. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 58-59.
51. Id. at 59.
52. See id. at 61-62 (reasoning that "any authority to obtain a temporary injunction gives the
State 'the paralyzing power of a censor"') (quoting Kingsleys Books, 354 U.S. at 446).
53. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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"burdens," is the most clearly defined, although when and to whom it is
applicable is not always certain. The Freedman Court required that the
burden of proving that the film is unprotected must rest with the censor. 4
The "burdens" requirement actually refers to two distinct burdens. First,
the regulating authority has the burden of going to court to justify a license
denial.55 Second, the authority also bears the burden of persuasion that the
speech engaged in by the applicant is unprotected. 6 The Supreme Court
reasoned that unless the government bore the responsibility, it might prove
too burdensome for the applicant to seek review5of
the censor's denial and
7
it would take little to deter exhibition of a film.
B. What Is a Specified BriefPeriod?
The second safeguard is less clear. The Freedman Court required that
the censor, within a "specified brief period, either issue a license or go to
court to restrain showing the film. ' 5 8 The Court declined to impose a
specific time limit, and instead left it to the State of Maryland to decide
how to incorporate the required procedural safeguards. 59 The Court stated,
"[w]e do not mean to lay down rigid time limits or procedures, but [rather]
to suggest considerations in drafting legislation to accord with local
exhibition practices." 6"
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined what constitutes a
"specified brief period," the case law is clear that the time frame must be
definite 6' and not illusory.6 2 The Court has indicated that where there is an
unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary
suppression is as great as that of unbridled discretion. 3 Further, the Court

54. Id. at 58.
55. See id. at 59.

56. See id. at 58.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id. at 59.
Id.
See id. at 61.
Id.; compare Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568, 1574 (D. Minn. 1992)

(ninety-day time limit acceptable for licensing); Ellwest Stereo Theater, Inc. v. Boner, 718 F. Supp.
1553, 1571 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (sixty-day time limit acceptable for licensing).
61. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 225,226 (1990) (quoting Riley v. National
Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988) (holding that a licensing scheme that fails to
provide definite time limitations within which the licensor must make a decision was
constitutionally unsound)).
62. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,769-70 (1998) (holding
that a standard requiring that license denial be in the "public interest" is an "illusory" standard that
"renders the guarantee against censorship little more than a high-sounding ideal").
63. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227.
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has stated that a scheme failing to set "reasonable time limits" on the
decision maker creates a risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible
speech 4
C. Prompt JudicialReview: A House Divided
Perhaps the least clear and most controversial of the safeguards is the
availability of "prompt judicial review." 65 The statute at issue in Freedman
granted a right of appeal to the Baltimore City Court and thereafter, to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.66 The Court struck the statute because it did
not provide an assuranceof judicial review.67
The Supreme Court has not provided explicit guidance as to what
satisfies this requirement. 68 Not surprisingly, this has led to a split among
the circuits as to what is "prompt" and what is "judicial review." "At least
three courts of appeal have interpreted [the decision to require] only access
to judicial review within a brief period, [as opposed to] judicial
determination on the merits. ' '69 The Seventh Circuit has held that
availability of writ of certiorari is sufficient.7'
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an ordinance need
only provide access to ajudicialproceeding.7 1 Conversely, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have held that merely providing access to judicial review
does not protect First Amendment freedom of expression.72 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit has held that provision for mandamus relief does not satisfy
the requirement because the reviewing court had the discretion to make the
writ returnable at any time.73 Consequently, no consensus currently exists
as to what will satisfy Freedman'srequirement of judicial review.

64. Id.

65. Id. at 228.
66. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 55.
67. See id. at 60.
68. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 228-30. Justice O'Connor ambiguously makes reference to the
requirement of availability of prompt judicial review, but failed to define what criteria would
suffice. See id
69. Guerra, supra note 2, at 1220 (emphasis added).
70. See id. (citing Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied,511 U.S. 1085 (1994)).
71. See id. (citing Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, Tex., 27 F.3d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir.
1994); TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705,709 (5th Cir. 1994); Jews for Jesus,
Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1327 (Ist Cir. 1993)); see also Boss
Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1256-57 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (holding that access
to judicial review satisfies prompt judicial review in licensing ordinances).
72. See Guerra, supra note 2, at 1220 (citing Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's
County, Md., 58 F.3d 988,999-1000 (4th Cir. 1995); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis,
48 F.3d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 909 (1995)).
73. See Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998).
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D. The Forkin the Road after FWJPBS v. City of Dallas7 4
Twenty-five years after the Freedman decision, the Supreme Court
deviated from its previously steadfast application of the three protections
to licensing schemes. In FW/PBS, the Supreme Court was presented with
an ordinance proposing to regulate sexually oriented businesses.75 The
challenged ordinance defined sexually oriented business as "'an adult
arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel,
adult motion picture theatre, adult theatre, escort agency, nude model
studio, or sexual encounter center."' 76 The ordinance at issue utilized a
scheme that incorporated zoning, licensing, and inspections to regulate
adult businesses.77 The Fifth Circuit upheld the ordinance as a contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation because it was "designed to
serve a substantial government interest" and "allowed for 'reasonable
alternative avenues of communication.' 78 The appeals court had decided
that the licensing scheme's failure to provide the Freedman safeguards
withstood constitutional challenge because such procedures are not as
important in the regulation of an ongoing commercial enterprise.79
On appeal, the City argued that it required every business, without
regard to whether it engages in First Amendment-protected speech, to
obtain a certificate of occupancy whenever it moved to a new location or
changed the use of a structure.80 However, in practice the City required an
inspection for sexually-oriented businesses even when the business had not
moved to a new structure or changed the use. The subject ordinance
required an inspection whenever ownership of such businesses changed,
or when the business applied for its annual permit renewal.82 Justice
O'Connor determined that the ordinance was "more onerous" in its
application to sexually-oriented businesses than the vast majority of other
businesses.83 Therefore, the Court held as a threshold matter that the
businesses challenging the ordinance had a First Amendment interest and
had standing to raise a facial challenge.Y

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

493 U.S. 215 (1990).
See id. at 220.
Id. (quoting DALLAS CITY CODE, ch. 41A, § 41A-2(19) (1986)).
See id.
Id. at 222.
See id.

80. See id. at 225.

81. See id.
82. See id.

83. Id.
84. See id.
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Although the Dallas ordinance purported to regulate neither obscenity
nor the motion picture industry, the Court applied the Freedman
procedures to the regulation of commercial enterprises.85 The Court
inexplicably applied Freedmanto the licensing scheme without deciding
whether the ordinance was purely ministerial and content-neutral.86
Significantly, the Court acknowledged that the City did not exercise
discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech. 7
Rather, the Court found that the City's review of the general qualifications
of each applicant was "a ministerial action that is not presumptively
invalid," but still required the protections.88 Indeed, the Court stated that
"[b]ecause we conclude that the city's licensing scheme lacks adequate
procedural safeguards, we do not reach [the issue of] ...whether the
ordinance is properly viewed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction ....
Therefore, since the decision did not turn on whether the ordinance was
content-based, Freedman presumably is applicable to any prior restraint,
even licensing schemes that are content-neutral and valid time, place, and
manner restrictions. Recently, the Ninth Circuit confirmed in Bernstein v.
United States Departmentof Justice that "prior restraint analysis applies
equally to content-neutral or content-based enactments,"' citing the
decision in FWIPBS.91
However, in a surprising departure from Freedman,the FW/PBS Court
stated that the Dallas licensing scheme did not present the "grave dangers
of a censorship system."92 Therefore, the "full procedural protections" of
Freedmanwere not required.93 Because the core policy of Freedman was
to issue a license for a First Amendment-protected business within a
reasonable period of time to avoid suppression of protected speech, the
Court mandated two safeguards. 4 The licensor was required to make the
decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time
during which status quo would be maintained, and also had to make
available prompt judicial review in the event of erroneous denial.95

85. See id. at 226.
86. See id. at 229.
87. See id.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 223.
90. 176 F.3d 1132, 1143 n.17 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. See generallyFW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215.
92. Id. at 228 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 228. Justice O'Connor erroneously referred to the safeguards required by the
decision as "the first two"; however, the two required were actually the second and third. See supra
notes 29-31.
95. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 228.
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Nevertheless, in a sharply fractured decision, the Court refused to
require the licensor to bear the burdens,96 which it erroneously referred to
as the "third" safeguard.97 Justice O'Connor explained that applications
under the Dallas scheme had more at stake than the distributor in
Freedman.98 In Freedman,only one film was censured and the distributor
would be unlikely to challenge a denial because the film would rapidly
become obsolete. 99
The Court reasoned that because a license is key to obtaining and
maintaining a business, and business has "every incentive to pursue a
license denial through court," there would be less danger of suppressing
speech as in the motion picture industry.0 ° Accordingly, where a licensing
scheme purports to regulate the licensure of "commercial ventures," the
government may not be required to bear the burden of justifying a denial
in court.
The current status of the "burdens" requirement is unclear. Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in FW/PBS dispensed with the "burdens"
requirement for business licensing schemes.' 0 ' However, since only
Justices Stevens and Kennedy' 2 concurred on the point, FW/PBS did not
overrule Freedman.Therefore, although the status of the first safeguard is
unclear, the dual requirements of limitation on the time within which to
issue a license and the availability of judicial review remains firmly in
place. 103
While the Supreme Court has clearly defined what the burdens are,
following FW/PBS, it still remains unclear when they will be required. In
Baby Tam & Co. v. City ofLas Vegas, the Ninth Circuit declined to reach
the "burdens" question, instead striking the statute at issue for failure to
satisfy the prompt judicial review requirement." In dicta, the Eleventh
Circuit has referred to the "burdens" safeguard as required in "most
circumstances.""' 5 The Middle District of Florida has referred to the
"burdens" requirement as one that could possibly be "done away with"

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 230.
See id.; see also supra note 29.
See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229.
See generally Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229-30.
101. See id at 230.
102. See id. at 220 (joining Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion).
103. See id. at 229.
104. 154 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998).
105. Church of Scientology Flag Sery. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1548 n.46
(11 th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the procedural safeguards contained in the ordinance at issue were
not challenged, and the court therefore specifically expressed no opinion concerning them).
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where the law at issue restricts classes of sexually oriented entertainment
businesses.1°6
At least two courts other than the FW/PBS plurality have held that only
the last two safeguards are required, but on different grounds.'O° In United
States v. Dunifer,the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California upheld- a statute regulating the operation of micro-radio
stations.10 8 Without explanation, the court stated that the requirement of
government to bear the burdens is only necessary in licensing schemes that
"act as a censorship system." 1 9 Thus, the Dunifercourt seemed to return
to a more narrow construction of Freedmanas it was originally applied.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit in Steakhouse, Inc. v. City of Raleigh,
sided with Justice O'Connor and declined to extend the burden of
persuasion portion of Freedmanto an ordinance regulating the licensing
of topless bars." 0 The Steakhouse court agreed with Justice O'Connor's
reasoning that the establishment would not be dissuaded from applying for
special use permits if it was required to bear the burden of persuasion to
prove the absence of adverse secondary effects."'
It is also unclear who will bear the "burdens." In United States v.
Marchetti,the Fourth Circuit cited Freedmanfor the propositions that prior
restraint may sometimes be warranted and that judicial review of a Central
Intelligence Agency decision on employee nondisclosure agreements must
be available."' Consistent with Freedman, though not citing it, the
Marchetti court held that the submitted materials by the employees must
be processed quickly." 3 However, in a strange and complete departure
from Freedman, the court required the employee to bear the burden of
proof on review rather than the CIA because of the "sensitivity of the
area.""14
IV.

FREEDMAN EVOLUTION:

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM OBSCENITY

The Freedmansafeguards were originally narrowly applied to the prior
restraint of an allegedly obscene motion picture." 5 The Freedman Court

106. Bledsoe v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(citing Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 2 F.3d at 1548).
107. See infra notes 108, 110.
108. 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
109. Id. at 1243.
110. 166 F.3d 634, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1999).
111. Seeid. at641.
112. 466 F.2d 1309,1317 (4thCir.),cert. denied,409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (citing Freednan,380
U.S. at 590-61).
113. 466F.2dat1317.
114. Id.
115. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57 ("[t]he administration of a censorship system for motion
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specifically held that a process "which requires the submission ofafilm to
a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system."'1"6 However, Freedmanhas subsequently been broadly applied to
prior restraints of any speech that is political, and is commonly applied to
licensing schemes completely unrelated to either films or obscenity.
The slide from the original application of regulating obscene films has
reached far into other governed activities. Southeastern Promotions
required the safeguards in a denial of the use of a privately-owned theatre
under lease to the city for the controversial musical production of Hair."7
FW/PBS applied Freedman to the regulation of "sexually oriented
businesses, defined by the ordinance in that case as adult arcades, video
stores, cabarets, motels, and theatres, escort agencies, nude model studios,
or sexual encounter centers.""' Blount v. Rizzi applied Freedmanto the
Postmaster General's administrative scheme of censoring mail and the use
of money orders for commerce in allegedly obscene materials. 1 9 The
protections were applied to seizure of obscene materials from luggage by
customs agents in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs.2 Slipping
further, Riley v. National Federation of the Blind2of N.C., Inc. applied
Freedmanto professional fund-raising campaigns.1 '
Even further removed from Freedman'soriginally limited scope, the
safeguards have been applied to a wide myriad of government regulations,
including an ordinance regulating permits to chant and solicit contributions
in parks by members of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness. 22 Freedman'ssafeguards were required in the regulation
of the location and structure of a newsstand;"' 3 an injunction prohibiting
political party parades;' 24 door-to-door solicitation for election
a restraining order prohibiting meetings of a racist
candidates; 125 and
6
organization.1

pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech").
116. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
117. 420 U.S. at 547, 561-62.
118. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 221.

119. 400 U.S. 410,411-12 (1971).
120. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
121. 487 U.S. 781 (1988); see also Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947 (1984) (applying Freedmanto a statute prohibiting charitable organizations from paying
fund-raising expenses of more than 25% of the amount raised).
122. See Iskon, Inc. v. Schmidt, 523 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Md. 1981).
123. See, e.g., Graff v. City of Chicago, 986 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,511 U.S.
1085 (1994).
124. See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
125. See, e.g., Nichols v. Village of Pelham Manor, 974 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
126. See, e.g., Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1968).
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Courts have applied Freedmanto a statute requiring real estate agents
to obtain a permit prior to soliciting listings;' 27 to a procedure for
revocation of a liquor license;1 to government's efforts to regulate
encryption software programs for transmitting information over the
Internet;" to a public library's blocking access to the Internet; 130 and to
state and local sign ordinances."' Lack of the protections has resulted in
the invalidation of a school policy that prevented a tenth-grader's
distribution in school of an underground newspaper objecting to an
education that "brainwash[ed]" students into being racist. 3 2 Also
invalidated was an ordinance prohibiting dancing in a public place,
including recreational 33
dancing "whether a square dance, the lambada,
pantomime, or ballet."
V. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ACTrivrrY-A HOTBED OF THORNY AND
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

A. Squaring Off on "PromptJudicialReview"
A sharp split exists among the circuits regarding the third Freedman
safeguard. Since FW/PBS rendered its plurality opinion, five circuits have
considered the meaning of "prompt judicial review."'13 4 The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have decided that prompt access to judicial review is
sufficient, even if no time frame exists for a hearing or a decision on the
merits. 35 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that only a prompt
decision on the merits will satisfy prompt judicial review. 36 The Ninth
Circuit has rejected the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' view that mere access
to judicial review is sufficient, concluding that prompt judicial review
127. See, e.g., Illinois Ass'n of Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 516 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
128. See, e.g., Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff, 354 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
129. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Department of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
130. See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 24
F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that even unprotected speech cannot be censored absent
sufficient standards and adequate procedural safeguards).
131. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
132. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54,56 (4th Cir. 1971).
133. Elam v. Bolling, 53 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859-60 (W.D. Va. 1999).
134. See, e.g., Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F. 3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998).
135. See id. (citing TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir.
1994); Graffv. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1085 (1994)).
136. See id. (citing 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County., Md., 58 F.3d 988
(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220,225 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 909 (1995)).
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means the "opportunity
for a prompt hearing'37 and a prompt decision by
138
a judicial officer."'
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the view that mere access to judicial
review is adequate in Redner v. Dean, but did not say what more is
required to satisfy the requirement. 139 In Redner, the Court of Appeals
considered a Citrus County ordinance regulating adult entertainment
establishments."4 In striking the statute for its failure to satisfy the
procedural requirement of prompt judicial review, the court discussed the
requirement at length, noting that the Freedmancase itself was unclear as
to what was required.' 4 '
The Rednercourt acknowledged that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Eleventh Circuit has addressed the issue squarely.'42 The Rednercourt then
rejected the ordinance because it required that an applicant who was denied
a license to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to judicial review,
and it contained no time limit for the Board of County Commissioners to
schedule a hearing. 43 The court stated that a state's statutory or commonlaw procedure for review of administrative decisions does not satisfy
Freedman.' Thus, although the Rednercourt stated what was inadequate
to satisfy judicial review, it nevertheless again failed to decide what would
be adequate, again leaving the question open.
In a recent decision, Boss Capitalv. City of Cassleberry,the Eleventh
Circuit faced the issue squarely in a challenge to an adult entertainment
licensing ordinance. 45 In Boss, one issue before the court was whether the
requirement of prompt judicial review was met since the ordinance
46
provided an explicit immediate judicial review of right in circuit court. 1
The applicant contended that because the ordinance did not guarantee that

137. Id. (The court explained that an opportunity for a prompt hearing requires consideration
of the dispute by a judicial officer because without consideration, there is no review.).

138. Id. (stating that a prompt decision by a judicial officer requires "a decision;" otherwise,
the most exhaustive review would be worthless).
139. See id. (citing Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501-02 (1lth Cir. 1994)).
140. 29 F.3d 1496.

141. See id. at 1501-03.
142. See id. at 1501-02 n.9 (citing Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Waish, 774 F.2d

1515 (11 th Cir. 1985) (striking an ordinance for its lack of a provision for prompt judicial review);
and Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (striking

a licensing ordinance because it "fumishe[d] no means for judicial review, prompt or otherwise,
of city commission decisions")).
143. Id. at 1502-03. The court acknowledged that exhaustion would not be required where a
party challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, but nevertheless rejected the rule because
an applicant might challenge a denial on other, non-constitutional grounds and would be required
to exhaust and procedural safeguards must be provided for all applicants. See id.
144. See id. at 1501 n.9 (citing Southeastern Promotions,420 U.S. at 561-62).
145. 187F.3d 1251 (llthCir. 1999).
146. See id. at 1255 (referencing Castleberry Code art. II, § 14-99(c)).
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courts would resolve appeals promptly, Freedmanwas not satisfied. 147 The
court acknowledged the disagreement among the circuits following
FW/PBS on whether a guarantee of prompt judicial resolution of appeals
is required from licensing denials. 48 Citing its prior decision in Redner that
failed to resolve the question, the Boss court addressed for the first time
review is sufficient for licensing denials
whether access to prompt judicial
149
censorships.
to
as opposed
Reasoning that the dangers of censorship are less threatening in
licensing schemes than censors judging the content of expression, the Boss
court upheld the ordinance, concluding that mere access to prompt judicial
review is sufficient to satisfy Freedman.'50 Thus, the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits are in alignment on the issue.'5 '
B. Poisedto Answer Applicability to Sign Regulations
Whether Freedman applies to zoning regulations for billboards and
signs is another uncertain and controversial issue. Case law on this matter
is unclear regarding the criteria for determining what is an inappropriate
content-based restriction of protected speech to which Freedmanwould be
applicable. Few courts have actually addressed the issue.
In another badly-fractured decision that produced five separate
opinions, the Supreme Court struck a statute regulating billboards and
signage as an unconstitutional regulation of protected speech. 5 2 The
ordinance at issue in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego provided an on-site
exception that applied only to commercial advertising which impermissibly
favored commercial over noncommercial speech. 53 The ordinance further
provided twelve exceptions to the general prohibition for particular types
of signs, such as "for sale," religious symbols, and temporary political
signs. 154Fourjustices agreed that an ordinance impermissibly inverts First
Amendment protections if it provides greater protection to commercial
speech than to noncommercial speech and allows commercial speech in
places where noncommercial speech is prohibited.155 Those same justices
would have struck the ordinance because the twelve exceptions amounted

147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1256.
150. See id. at 1257.
151. See id. at 1255.
152. See generally Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking a
statute prohibiting the display of noncommercial billboards where commercial billboards were
allowed).
153. See id. at 493-96.
154. Id. at 494-95.
155. See id. at 513-16.
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to a content-based restriction."' Two concurring justices and three
dissenters relied upon completely separate analyses. 5 7 If the plurality had
stricken the ordinance on different grounds, that is, that it was an
unconstitutional content-based restraint on protected speech, then ergo, the
Freedman protections would have also been required.
Nearly sixteen years after Metromedia, a similar sign ordinance was
challenged in Oregon not only as an impermissible content-based
restriction on speech, but also for its failure to provide the Freedman
safeguards. 8 In OutdoorMedia, the Court of Appeals sharply criticized
Metromedia. Citing a Third Circuit opinion, the court agreed that "it is
difficult to divine what, if any, principles from Metromedia became the
governing standard for future cases, i.e., 'the law of the land."" 5 9 However,
the OutdoorMedia court failed to decide whether to follow Metromedia,
instead distinguishing the Oregon ordinance from the stricken Metromedia
ordinance because it applied equally to commercial and noncommercial
speech."6 The court determined that the ordinance did not impermissibly
favor commercial speech. 6 ' The Outdoor Media court also considered
whether Freedmanwas applicable since the ordinance did not require the
official to approve or deny a sign permit "within a specified brief
period."' 62 The court held that "no such deadline" was required because it
found that the ordinance was content-neutral, unlike the statute in
Freedmanregulating motion pictures.161
The OutdoorMedia court rejected the argument that in both FW/PBS
and an earlier case, Riley, the Supreme Court applied Freedman even to
statutes that were content-neutral.' 4In Riley, the statute at issue regulated
professional fundraising for charity and compelled the disclosure of fee

156. See id. at 520.
157. See Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. State, 945 P.2d 614, 620 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(discussing the splintered decision of Metromedia).
158. See generally id.
159. Id. at 620 (citing Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1057 (3d Cir. 1994)). The
OutdoorMedia court further quoted the Supreme Court's statement that when "no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in thejudgment on the narrowest grounds."'
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
160. See id. at 620.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 623-24.
163. Id. at 624.
164. See id.; see generallyFW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215; Riley, 487 U.S. at 781 (holding that the
Freedmansafeguards were required although the statutes did not involve content-based review by
a licensing official).
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percentages.' 65 The Riley Court required the regulation to provide that the
licensor "'will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go
to court." ' 166
The OutdoorMedia court distinguished the ordinance at issue from the
statutes in FW/PBS and Riley because there the licensing schemes
themselves represented "a legislative attempt to restrict speech on the basis
of content."' 67 The Outdoor Media court stated that neither FW/PBS
(zoning, licensing, and inspection of adult businesses) nor Riley
(professional fundraising) involved laws that required content review by
an official, but were unconstitutional because they provided no time limit
for a decision. 61 Incongruously, the OutdoorMedia court then reasoned
that
"[b]ecause, as in Freedman [sic], both laws involved a branch
of government other than the judiciary in evaluating speech
on the basis of content, the unlimited delay in obtaining
judicial review amounted to an improper prior restraint. The
same concern, however, is not present here, because the ...
provisions do not require
the department to review the content
' 16
of a ... message.
It is unclear how the Outdoor Media court distinguished these cases,
because as the court acknowledged, none of the regulations in Riley,
FW/PBS, or the case at bar involved content review by an official. 70
The OutdoorMedia court found that the ordinance at issue applied to
all billboards, regardless of the content of the message, and was not a
legislative attempt to classify and restrict speech based on content."'
Therefore, the court refused to require the Freedman safeguards. 72
The Outdoor Media court similarly rejected the argument that the
Supreme Court had affirmed the plurality decision from Metromedia in
City ofLadue v. Gilleo."' In a mere footnote and without explanation, the
court simply concluded that "our reading of that case does not support
plaintiff's assertion."'7

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Riley, 487 U.S. 781, 784-85.
Id. at 802 (quoting Freedman, 38 U.S. at 59).
OutdoorMedia, 945 P.2d at 624.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id
See id. at 620 n.9 (citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)).
Id.
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The Oregon Court of Appeals later reaffirmed its position in Media Art
Co. v. City of Gates.75 In that case, the court determined that a provision
allowing the city recorder to permit land use that is "in general keeping"
with listed uses did not give unbridled discretion to a government
official. 7 6 Accordingly, the court found that the statute was not an
unconstitutional prior restraint.' However, after its decision in Outdoor
Media, it is unclear whether the Media Arts court would have held
Freedmanapplicable if it had found unbridled discretion.
The Eleventh Circuit has never addressed the issue of whether
Metromediais binding in light of the plurality opinion.17 However, in Cafr
Erotica v. St. Johns County, the Middle District of Florida decided, in a
footnote, that it will follow the Third Circuit and the Metromedia plurality
opinion, that "[i]f [the ordinance] ... in question is substantially identical
to the San Diego Ordinance at issue in Metromedia, then [we] are bound
to strike it down."' 7 9 Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, if a sign ordinance
improperly inverts First Amendment protections by favoring commercial
over noncommercial or political speech, it is invalid. Similarly, if an
ordinance allows an official discretion over a sign's message, then
presumably, it would be a content-based restriction to which Freedman
applies.
The Cafj Erotica court discussed prior restraints, but failed to decide
whether the Freedmanrequirements were applicable." 0 The Cafd Erotica
court stated that in the Eleventh Circuit, a permitting system "in order to
be acceptable with respect to First Amendment freedoms, must be almost
a completely ministerial act."' 8 ' The court then found that the ordinance
impermissibly contained unbridled discretion which allowed for content
discrimination and "corresponding chilling of First Amendment rights."' 2
Citing Rednerv. Deanand Bledsoe v. City ofJacksonvilleBeach, the court
further found that the ordinance was vulnerable because it failed to be
8 3
acted on within a "reasonable" and "specific" period of time.

175. 974 P.2d 336 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).

176. Id. at 344.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id.
See Caft Erotica, No. 98-597-CIV-J-21C, at *10 n.3.
Id. (quotingRappa,18 F.3d at 1061).
See id. at 17-19.

181. Id. at 17-18 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (citing Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1978) (citing Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976))).
182. Id. at 18-19.
183. Id. at 18 (citing Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that a state's
statutory or common law procedure for review of administrative decisions does not satisfy
Freedman);Bledsoe v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (striking
an ordinance for its failure to comply with Freedman)).
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Oddly, despite the fact that the Eleventh Circuit in Redner'84 and the
Middle District in Bledsoe18' had applied Freedman, the court refused to
decide whether Freedman applied to the sign ordinance. The decision is
surprising in light of the court's determination that the ordinance contained
unbridled discretion,'86 a prior restraint under Freedman,and that it failed
to provide the specified, brief period protection required by Freedman.87
The court simply perfunctorily stated that "the record has not been
adequately developed with respect to the requirements of Freedman v.
[Maryland] and as such, the Court will not address in this preliminary
injunction order those requirements."' 8 Subsequently, the parties settled
their differences, leaving the question of Freedman'sapplicability to sign
regulation ultimately unsettled in the Eleventh Circuit.
VI. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. A Practitioner'sModelfor Attacking Regulations
Many Practitioners are unaware of Freedman'spotential applicability
to a vast array of local regulations. Where a client desires to invalidate an
ordinance, Freedman can be a powerful tool in accomplishing that goal.
Practitioners would do well to become familiar with the three procedural
requirements and to understand how and when Freedman applies.
As a threshold matter, anyone may bring a facial challenge to a
licensing scheme regardless of whether he or she has been denied a permit.
In Freedman,the Court stated that it is well-settled in the area of freedom
of expression that "one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground
that it delegates overly-broad licensing discretion to an administrative
office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn
statute, and whether or not he applied for a license."' 8 9 Further, "one who
might have had a license for the asking may... call into question the
whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to procure
it.,,,g0

184. See generally Redner, 29 F.3d at 1495 (striking an ordinance regulating adult
entertainment establishments).
185. See generally Bledsoe, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (striking an ordinance purporting to
regulate a rally to generate public support to change law prohibiting the sale, possession, and use
of marijuana).
186. See Caft Erotica,No. 98-597-CIV-J-21C, at *18-19.
187. See id. at 18.
188. Id. at 19.
189. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965).
190. Id. (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313, 319 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452-53
(1938)). "Standing is recognized in such cases because of the '. . . danger of tolerating, in the area
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A challenge to a restriction should first establish that the speech at issue
is protected. This is typically a rather simple matter because most speech
can be characterized as "political" or otherwise protected. However, even
unprotected speech cannot be censored without adequate procedural
safeguards. 19 ' Next, a challenger should allege that an applicant may not
obtain a permit to engage in the speech without complying with the statute,
citing the relevant provisions. The next objective should be to establish
that the law is an unlawful prior restraint and is therefore unconstitutional.
A good argument would remind the court of the heavy burden against prior
restraints and that strict scrutiny applies. 192 To establish that the ordinance
is an impermissible prior restraint, the complaint should raise the following
separate but related objections:
1. Overbroad Discretion
The Practitioner should argue that the permitting scheme contains
unlawful discretion, citing any specific sections of the ordinance which
allow a government official to make determinations that are not purely
ministerial. For instance, ordinances commonly provide for decisions that
something is "in the public interest," "contrary to public interest," "would
result in unnecessary and undue hardship," "contains an obscene message,"
"on terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable," etc., citing
City of Lakewood 93 and Shuttlesworth.94 The argument is that since the
ordinance lacks insufficient constraints or standards to guide the
government official, it contains overbroad discretion and is therefore,
unconstitutional.

of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application."' Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
191. See MainstreamLoudoun, 24 F. Supp. at 568-69 ("Whatever the reasons may have been
for the board's exclusion of the musical, it could not escape the obligation to afford appropriate
procedural safeguards. We need not decide whether the ... production is in fact obscene.") (quoting
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975)).
192. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at225; SoutheasternPromotions,420 U.S. at 558; Shuttlesworth,
394 U.S. at 150-51; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 (contentbased restrictions on speech survive First Amendment scrutiny only if they are necessary to serve
a compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to achieve that end.).
193. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769-72 (striking ordinance regulating newspaper boxes
because the official had authority to impose "terms and conditions deemed necessary and
reasonable"). The Court stated that a standard requiring that license denial be in the "public
interest" is an "illusory" standard that "renders the guarantee of censorship little more than a highsounding ideal." Id.
194. Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 147,150-51 (holding that a law subjecting protected speech
to the prior restraint of a license "without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the

licensing authority, is unconstitutional").
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2. Lack of Content Neutrality
Next, the Practitioner should cite Forsyth County to argue that the
ordinance is content-based and impermissibly subject to the unbridled
discretion of government officials. 9 5 A law is content-neutral if it is
justified without regard to the content of the regulated speech. 96 The
appropriate test for validity is whether the government has adopted a
narrowly-tailored rule, designed to serve a substantial government interest
without regard to the message that the speech conveys. 97
The Administrator will counter that its law is a valid time, place, or
manner regulation. The Practitioner should attempt to establish that the law
is not a valid restriction because 1) it is content-based, 2) it falls to leave
open adequate alternative channels, or 3) the government failed to show a
significant governmental interest. 198 A government may not select a
particular type of speech for differential treatment.' 99 Further, a
government may not favor any type of commercial speech over
noncommercial speech. 200 For example, many sign regulations contain a
typical laundry-list of exclusions to sign ordinances such as for rent, for
sale, advertising on vehicles, mobile signs bearing advertising,
construction, and subdivision signs. The Practitioner might argue that such
an ordinance impermissibly inverts First Amendment values and treats
195. See Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) ("[A]ny
permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content
of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must
leave open ample alternatives for communication.").
196. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989) (setting forth the test for
determining whether a regulation is content-neutral).
197. See id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)); see also Macdonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Ward,491
U.S. at 798-99).
198. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 986 F.2d 1180,1183-84 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that although
the City's interests in enacting the ordinance were substantial, those interests were "not sufficiently
'compelling' to support a content-based restriction"); see also Goward, 456 N.W.2d at 468
(holding ordinance was not a valid time, place, or manner restriction because it was content-based,
it failed to leave open adequate alternative channels, and the city failed to show a significant
government interest because aesthetic interest alone cannot be a compelling state interest).
199. See Goward, 456 N.W.2d at 464-66 (discussing other jurisdictions considering
ordinances that have uniformly held that a city "may not select a particular type of speech for

differential treatment").
200. See National Adver. Co. v. City ofOrange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988) (city cannot

analyze content of outdoor noncommercial messages to determine whether and where they are
allowed); see also City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 62 (Colo. 1981)
(ordinances limiting permissible messages born by political signs are unconstitutional); New Jersey
v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. 1980) (ordinance which limited residential property owner's
communication constitutes an absolute ban on political speech); City of Euclid v. Mabel, 484
N.E.2d 249, 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (ordinance which regulates on the basis of subject matter
is invalid on its face), cert. denied,474 U.S. 826 (1985).
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commercial speech more favorably than political speech. 20' Practitioner's
argument is that the law not only impermissibly seeks to regulate speech
on the basis of content, it also favors commercial over noncommercial and
political speech, rendering it constitutionally infirm.
3. Lack of Mandated Procedural Safeguards
A Practitioner should assert that the regulation is a prior restraint on
activities protected by the First Amendment that lacks required procedural
safeguards. Because the ordinance either places unbridled discretion in the
hands of an official or fails to place limits on the time within which the
decision maker must issue the license, it is a prior restraint. 2' Therefore,
all three Freedmanprotections must be provided.20 3
First, the ordinance is invalid if it fails to give the government the
burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the challenged
expression is without constitutional protection. 1° Second, the ordinance
must require the authority to either issue a license within a specified and
definite brief period while maintaining the status quo or go to court.2 °5 If
the ordinance does specify a time period, the practitioner might argue that
the time period is not reasonable under the circumstances. 06 Third, the
ordinance must provide prompt judicial review of any denial.20 7 The
argument is that if the ordinance contains any of the constitutional
infirmities condemned in FW/PBS, it is unconstitutional. 28
The Administrator will further argue that the ordinance is a purely
ministerial action that is content neutral. The Practitioner can counter this
argument by citing FW/PBS, which did not turn on whether the ordinance
at bar was content-based.2" Indeed, the Court decided that the ordinance
was "a ministerial action that [was] not presumptively invalid," yet applied
Freedmannotwithstanding. 210 The argument then becomes that even if the
court determines that the ordinance is a valid time, place, or manner
restriction, the protections are applicable in any prior restraint, even
content-neutral licensing schemes. The Practitioner may cite the Bernstein
201. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516 (striking ordinance that permitted on-site commercial
billboard advertising but prohibited both commercial and noncommercial messages on off-site
billboards).
202. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226.
203. See generallyFreedman, 380 U.S. at 51.
204. See id. at 58.
205. See id.at 59.
206. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 227.
207. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59; see also supra Part III(C) for a discussion of what is
required to satisfy this burden in particular circuits.
208. See generallyFW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215.
209. See id. at 229.
210. Id.
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court's statement that "prior restraint analysis applies equally to contentneutral or content-based enactments. 2 n
The Administrator will argue that under FW/PBS, it does not bear the
"burdens" in a permitting scheme regulating commercial ventures.
However, the practitioner should argue that since FW/PBS failed to garner
a majority opinion on this issue,212 it did not overrule Freedman and all
three mandates are required.
B. An Administrator'sModelfor ProtectingRegulations
Although the Practitioner may have the bigger club, an Administrator
at least has a shield. Once a facial challenge is brought under the First
Amendment, an Administrator may argue against the heavy presumption
of unconstitutional prior restraints by charging the court with the wellsettled duty to resolve doubts as to constitutionality in favor of validity,
when reasonably possible. 213 Then the ordinance may be defended by
asserting the following arguments:
1. Valid Time, Place, or Manner Regulation
The Administration should assert that the ordinance is not a prior
restraint on protected speech. Rather, it is purely ministerial and a valid
time, place, or manner restriction because it is 1) content-neutral, 2) it
leaves open adequate alternative channels, and 3) the government has a
sufficiently compelling interest in enacting the law.
2. Law of General Application
The administrator should establish that the regulation is a law of
general application rather than being "directed narrowly and specifically
at expression" and as such, is not subject to a facial attack as a prior
restraint. 2 4 A law of general application affords government officials only
intermittent and unpredictable opportunities to exercise unrestrained
discretion over expression.21 5 However, the challenger will argue, as in
Bernstein, that the ordinance has a chilling and censorial effect on

211. See Bernstein v. Department of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1143 n.17 (9th Cir. 1999).
212. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 220.
213. See State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994) (quoting State v. Elder, 382 So.
2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980)); Sandlin v. Criminal Justice Standards & Training Comm'n, 531 So. 2d
1344, 1346 (1998).
214. City ofLakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61 (holding that a "law of general application" would
not be subject to a facial attack as a prior restraint because it carries "little danger of censorship").
215. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1143 n.17 (holding that the government's purpose in
regulating encryption source code is irrelevant because a prepublication licensing regime that has
a chilling and censorial effect on expression is properly subject to facial attack).
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expression regardless of the purpose behind it and therefore, is properly
subject to facial attack as a prior restraint.2 t6
3. Least Restrictive Means Possible
An administrator may be able to argue that the regulation is a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because it serves important
state interests by the least restrictive means possible.2 7 As stated in United
States v. O'Brien,a governmental interest may sometimes justify incidental
limitations on protected speech, but only
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is 2no
18 greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
However, even if any or all of the above arguments are successful, the
Administrator still has to contend with the applicability of Freedman.
Following such decisions FWPBS2 9 and Bernstein,220 a challenger can
probably successfully argue that the procedures are mandatory, regardless
of whether the licensing regime is content-neutral or content-based.
Presumably, the ordinance will provide at least some procedural
216. See id. at 26 (citing City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (upholding facial attack against
ordinance regulating newsracks because of censorial effects, without discussing the government's
purpose in enacting the ordinance)).
217. See 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. City of West Haven., 761 F.2d 105, 105-12 (2d Cir. 1985).
"Regulations governing in advance the time, place, or manner of expression
permitted in a particular public forum are valid if they serve important state
interests by the least restrictive means possible.... Put another way, a regulation
that is directed primarily at conduct or at noncommunicative aspects of protected
expressive activities is permissible despite an incidental prior burden on
expression if it is justified by sufficiently strong permissible government
interests."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115, 1120
(Ist Cir. 1981)).
218. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding a regulation as sufficiently justified because it met
the Court's four-pronged test).
219. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 233 (requiring the procedures despite its statement that
"[b]ecause we conclude that the city's licensing scheme lacks adequate procedural safeguards, we
do not reach.., whether the ordinance is properly viewed as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction ....).
220. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1143 n.17 (stating that prior restraint analysis applies equally
to content-neutral or content-based regulations).
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protections, and it may become a battle to defend what already exists as a
proper application of the three Freedmanrequirements.
4. Structure of the Ordinance
In light of the tremendous potential for a court to apply Freedman to a
licensing scheme, an Administrator would do well to comply with the
requirements before a challenge is instituted. The procedures of prompt
judicial review and a specified brief period for a decision will almost
certainly be required. The level of judicial review and what length of time
will satisfy Freedman will depend on the case law in the appropriate
jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction, however it may be wise and cost efficient
to specify a relatively short period of time for the official's decision and
judicial review that will satisfy even the most stringent court. Access to
judicial review in many jurisdictions will be insufficient, as will
availability of writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari. To be safe, an
Administrator should provide a right of judicial review in an appropriate
court.
The thorny question then becomes whether the ordinance must provide
for the "burdens." Bearing the burden of instituting the proceeding
following a denial of a permit and the burden of persuasion once in court
can be an expensive proposition for a local government. An argument
might be made that where the ordinance seeks to regulate commercial
ventures, the burdens are not required. However, in light of the fractured
decision of FW/PBS, a challenger might successfully counter-argue that the
decision did not overrule Freedman,and all three procedures are required.
Unfortunately, whether to provide for a governmental body to bear the
"burdens" will ultimately come down to a cost-efficiency decision based
on the risk aversion and political tolerance in the community. It may be
less costly for the government to assume the burdens initially in an area
where few permits are denied. However, in an area where moral values are
high and citizens demand heavy control over political and protected
expression, challenges may come frequently, and if the taxpayers are
willing to expend resources to preserve their ideals, it may well be worth
risking the battle.
An Administrator can further protect its ordinances by closely relating
the impact of the speech or activity being regulated to the promotion of the
government's stated interest. For example, regulating traffic patterns, noise
levels, and parking places of adult bookstores or entertainment businesses
should be expressly linked to the government's interest in preserving
neighborhoods or property values, or minimizing danger to children.22 ' The

221. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,73-75 (1981) (requiring the City
to relate the impact of what is being regulated, however precisely defined, to the promotion of the
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ordinance should also specify what other adequate alternative channels of
communication remain available, such as a speaker's ability to conduct
rallies or parades, distribute handbills, erect signage, existence of
alternative zoning districts, etc.222
In this unsettled area of law, perhaps Administrators would be wise to
follow the advice given by one United States District Court and "bypass
the perplexities of prior restraint
by establishing all the parameters.., in
223
the zoning code proper."
C. Application, Unpredictability,and the Needfor Demarcation
Courts are increasingly finding Freedman applicable to an everwidening class of regulations. Nearly all speech can be classified as
political or protected. The controversial, fragmented opinion of FW/PBS
seems to have been an attempt to rein in Freedmanby limiting the required
safeguards where an applicant has a great enough incentive to pursue an
allegedly erroneous license or permit denial. 2 ' The FW/PBS decision may
provide somewhat of a standard as to whether the "burdens" safeguard is
required in certain situations, but it is far from enough. Moreover, in light
of its ambiguous language and failure to garner a majority, it has
contributed greatly to the uncertainty that abounds in the area of prior
restraints. 25
The Supreme Court would well serve the needs of Administrators and
Practitioners alike if it would end the confusion and conclusively set forth
standards for determining exactly what the procedures are and when they
will be required. As of the date of this writing, Freedman has been cited
well over a thousand times. We have already seen how far it has reached.
But the ultimate question remains: How far will it go?

City's interest); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) ("[The

regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interests."); 754 OrangeAve.,
761 F.2d at 112 (holding that an ordinance fails as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction
because it lacks reference either to a significant state interest or to the existence of adequate
alternative channels of communication).
222. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976) (plurality
concluding no suppression of lawful speech where a myriad of permissible locations remains
despite zoning restrictions); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47

(1986) (citing for the proposition that content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are
acceptable if they are designed to serve substantial government interests and do not unreasonably

limit alternative means of communication. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron

v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)).
223. 801 Conklin St., Ltd. v. Town of Babylon, 38 F. Supp. 2d 228, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
224. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 229-30.
225. See id. at 220 (only Justices Stevens and Kennedy concurred on the point).
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American courts could conceivably require the Freedman procedures
in ordinances regulating noise, assembly on public streets, tattoo and body
piercing parlors, fortune tellers, jewelry and dress codes, bumper stickers,
license tags, systems that establish television and compact disc ratings,
pro-life protestors, street musicians, and art shows. For example, does a
building permit for a movie theatre require Freedman protections even
when no particular movies are being considered?
Presumably, the Supreme Court neither intends nor desires potential
challenges to laws governing heavily-regulated areas such as white
supremacy and Communism proponents, flag burning, animal rights and
environmental activists, pro-life protestations of abortion clinics, and even
street begging or intersection solicitation of donations. However, as the
situation currently exists, anyone who might obtain a license to engage in
such activities has strong ammunition to invalidate such a regulation. The
Supreme Court would do great justice by drawing a line that is clearly
discernable to all.
If prepublication review is to exist, the importance of maintaining the
delicate balance between the government and its citizens concerning the
power to decide what can be said or heard is compelling. Since political or
protected speech is a stake, the Court must be careful to circumscribe the
government's powers. But it must also be careful to prevent the further
careen of Freedman down what has become a very slippery slope.
Freedmanv. Marylandrepresents a fundamental threat to that balance, and
the Supreme Court should take precautions against its over-extension and
abuse.
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